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Abstract: 
This article investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the energy 
voting choices of State Duma deputies between 1994 and 2003, controlling for other factors 
such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic 
parameters. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an 
ordered probit model to explain energy market reform in the first decade of Russia’s 
democratic transition. Our main finding is that the gas production factor is inter temporally 
important in the formation of the deputies’ legislative choices and shows Gazprom’s strategic 
position in the post-Soviet Russian economy. The oil production factor is variably significant 
in the two first Dumas, when the main legislative debates on oil privatization occur. The 
energy committee membership tends to consistently explain pro-reform voting choices. The 
pro-and anti-reform poles observed in our Poole-based single dimensional scale are not 
necessarily connected with liberal and state-oriented policies respectively.  
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I. Introduction 
The formation of the State Duma was a crucial parameter of Russia’s transition to 
democracy. It signalled a major shift in Russian political development and institutional 
structures, because it facilitated the emergence of new actors, seeking to set the rules of 
political play and, therefore, maximize their welfare.  Market reform has been the outcome of 
presidential initiatives rather than proposals submitted by deputies (Mau 1998: 101-105). The 
State Duma is not an autonomous public policy player in Russian federal politics, because it is 
not able to enforce any policy measures without presidential approval; the reason for this is 
that the 1993 Constitution was designed by extra-constitutional actors with de facto executive 
authority. Still, the Duma is the most powerful internal constraint to presidential power both in 
pragmatic and constitutional terms.   
Explaining the role of parliamentary institutions requires an analytical approach 
encompassing both individual strategies and collective interests. The economics of institutions 
proposes an equilibrium model, which defines institutional change in terms of objectives, the 
allocation of property rights and the reduction of transaction costs (Smith 2001: 10-15). This 
approach provides a conceptual framework for understanding the institutional dynamics 
leading to the creation of legislatures.  
Why is it interesting to focus on Russia? The energy industry is the most important 
sector of the contemporary Russian economy. In 2002 it possessed one fourth of the GDP, one 
third of the industrial commodity production, one half of federal budget returns and more than 
56 percent of Russian exports (Russian Bureau of Economic Analysis 2004). The management 
of energy resources has been a pillar of state economic policy and political competition in 
post-Soviet Russia. It has affected the comparative competitiveness of energy companies both 
at the domestic and the international level. For most of the energy companies, which were 
established in the privatization and post-privatization period, the transfer of public property 
was the result of a proper arrangement among pivotal centres of power: this was the case for   3
Lukoil and Surgutneftegas.  Thus, it is highly relevant to assess the legislative politics of 
energy regulation. We can expect that powerful interest groups may influence the bargaining 
strategies of both sides: the executive and the legislative. Particularly in the case of Gazprom, 
the fact that it constitutes the world’s biggest natural gas monopoly and exporter indicates the 
strategic importance of its reform; Gazprom’s reform has to be in line with the projected 
increase in its natural gas exports and, thus, its further support of the federal budget. Looking 
at the past 10 years, one could hypothesize that the State Duma preferred to pursue a pro-
state and anti-reformist agenda as opposed to the market-oriented agenda of the Russian 
Government.  
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the legislative dimensions of market reform 
in the Russian energy sector. It focuses on the extrapolation of those resource factors that 
have determined legislative choices on energy regulation and privatization while controlling in 
a multivariate framework for several factors.  
In addition, our paper provides several novel findings and a new methodological 
approach not seen, to our knowledge, in previous research. First, we observe a lack of 
empirical evidence in the field of energy regulation that investigates the impact of regional 
conditions on deputies’ voting behaviour. Second, we work with a new data set that has not 
been substantially explored so far. Our data set allows investigating the First, Second and 
Third Duma, looking therefore at a relatively long and dynamic period. Each Duma provides a 
different setting due to a change in the profile of the respective energy roll call votes. 
Investigating all three Dumas also provides the great advantage of analysing the impact of 
regional conditions in diverse environments. Moreover, our data set includes a relatively rich 
set of control variables covering aspects such as deputies’ party affiliation, electoral mandate, 
committee membership, gender and regional origin. We are also able to control for party 
switches during a Duma term. Finally, we provide in a novel manner a way to investigate 
quantitatively deputies’ behaviour on a set of roll calls.    4
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the constitutional and political powers of 
the State Duma are presented and elaborated; the profile of major energy roll call votes 
between 1994 and 2003 is used as an explanatory pattern for understanding the 
parliamentary parameters of energy market reform in Russia. In Section 3, the literature 
review and the set of hypotheses are provided, while in Section 4 our hypotheses are 
operationalised by an econometric model and our methodology is clarified by the data 
evaluation process. Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 finishes with some 
concluding remarks on the political and economic role of regional resources in energy 
regulation at the legislative level.  
 
II. The Constitutional Role of the State Duma and the Profile of Energy 
Roll Call Votes on Key Issues 
 
  The State Duma is the main legislative body in Russia. All federal law bills must be 
submitted to the Duma and adopted with a majority vote before they are considered by the 
Council of Federation, the Upper Chamber of the Federal Assembly, and the President. In 
addition, the State Duma has major non-legislative capacities; it can appoint and dismiss the 
Chairman of the Russian Central Bank, the Human Rights Commissioner, and the Chairman of 
the Office of Auditors and half of its members (article 103 of the Russian Constitution). The 
State Duma confirms the appointment of the Prime Minister, although it does not have the 
power to confirm Government ministers. The State Duma passes a bill only when an absolute 
majority of the total number of its members votes for it in three consecutive readings. The 
energy roll calls of the First Duma entailed extensive negotiations on the ownership status and 
privatization of the oil and gas sector, handled issues of electricity tarification and supply, and 
instigated critical debates on the regulation of natural monopolies.    5
The deregulation of the Russian oil sector in the mid-1990s and the reform plans for 
Gazprom and RAO UESR, which continued to maintain a natural monopoly status in their main 
areas of economic activity, were debated issues in the State Duma. The respective bills 
became sources of intense multilevel bargaining, transcending institutional, political, and 
ideological boundaries. The preservation of Gazprom’s monopoly and vertically integrated 
structure along with direct and detailed price regulation served the Government’s long-term 
interests and protected consumers from arbitrary pricing. The division of the Russian 
electricity market into competitive and monopoly segments, as illustrated in the reform 
proposal adopted by the Duma in March 2003, enabled the state administration to grant the 
right of market entry and, thus, regulate market competition (Butyrkin 2003: 10-11).  
The INDEM database (Satarov and Blagoveshenskii 2003) reports that for the 1994-
1995 period the basic law drafts on energy policy were the following:
i the bill on oil and gas, 
the bill on the regulation of natural monopolies and the bill on electricity tariffs. In all cases, 
when the amendments proposed by an opposition or pro-governmental deputy were accepted 
and subsequently incorporated to the bill, the roll call procedure was followed. Deputies were 
required to vote by majority for the amended bill in three consecutive readings before they 
forwarded it to the Federation Council. This may explain why the Federal Laws on Oil and Gas, 
Natural Monopolies and Electricity Tariffs constitute documents of great political value: not 
only do they reflect clashes of interests and ideological cleavages, which are strongly 
correlated with Russia’s early transition to democracy. They also signal the emergence of 
powerful oil oligarchs whose entrepreneurial activities were central to the post-Soviet variety 
of state-led capitalism. The energy law bills in the First Duma were conceived and designed by 
the presidential administration; the lack of logrolling strategies or critical bill amendments by 
the communist or centrist opposition indicates the full-fledged dominance of President Yeltsin’s 
policy set.   6
The implementation of radical economic reforms in 1994 and 1995 abruptly introduced 
the concepts of property rights and market organization. The reform of the oil sector was a 
key stage in the massive privatizations occurred in post-Soviet Russia. The State Duma voted 
for private access to public resources and linked market forces to state regulation (Nureev 
2003 Part II: 116-118). Nevertheless, the use of executive decrees under article 90 of the 
1993 Constitution and the confirmatory, rather than substantive, role of the Duma in policy-
making deprived energy reforms of a solid democratic foundation (Moser 2001: 169). 
Reformers in the executive perceived the reform of the oil sector as their own privilege. In 
addition, the increased number of party fractions in the First Duma may have slowed down 
the legislative process, but it did not allow parliamentary minorities to manipulate energy roll 
call votes as veto opportunities against the government (Doering 2004: 90). The Federal Laws 
on Natural Monopolies, State Regulation of Energy Tariffs, and Gas Supply voted on in 1995 
were efforts to develop an effective regulatory framework at the federal level (Tsapelik 2000: 
5-6). However, most of those serious problems related to regulatory reform in the oil, gas and 
electricity sectors remained unresolved. In particular, the Federal Law on Natural Monopolies 
did not even encourage further investment activity in the energy sector.  
In its second term, the Russian Duma evolved as an independent player and undertook 
major legislative initiatives on energy policy issues. Although President Yeltsin always retained 
the prerogative to dissolve the Duma and go to elections, the financial crisis of 1998 and 
Russia’s domestic front in Chechnya did not leave sufficient margins for political moves. Tax 
obligations and the privatization of Gazprom, the privatization of Slavneft and Rosneft and the 
role of Anatolii Chubais in the nascent electricity reform constitute the political-economic axes 
of the legislative reform agenda.
ii Specifically, the State Duma voted for a bill that prevented 
the disintegration of Gazprom, going against World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
proposals. By approving this law bill, the State Duma signalled its intention of keeping gas 
prices low and that way protecting Gazprom’s state monopoly; it condemned the inflexible   7
fiscal policy against an important budget supporter and free-service provider to the 
population and production sector and invited the Russian Government to regulate Gazprom’s 
arrears on the basis of domestic economic interests and national security (Satarov and 
Blagoveshenskii 2003).  
The Communist opposition made substantial efforts to block the privatization of two oil 
companies which were still under state control: Rosneft and Slavneft. In the case of Rosneft, 
the State Duma asked the Government for access to the legal documents containing the 
conditions of privatization.
iii As for Slavneft, a joint-venture owned by the Russian and 
Belarusian Governments, the opposition recommended that the Kremlin postpone its sale, 
wait until the parliamentary approval of a law bill regulating the privatization process, and 
negotiate with the Belarusian side on the company’s operation.
iv The sale of Sibneft’s control 
packet to the Bank of New York was also the topic of a parliamentary session where the perils 
of US participation into oil production in Siberia were discussed.
v In addition, a major political 
move of the Duma was to vote for the cancellation of Chubais’s appointment as CEO of RAO 
UESR, Russia’s electricity monopoly (Satarov and Blagoveshenskii 2003).  
The Third Duma, which was elected in December 1999, continued to demonstrate its 
veto power over the key reform initiatives of the Government. The preference of the Duma 
majority for the preservation of RAO UESR as a natural monopoly was evident. This 
persistence on the negative role of Anatolii Chubais and his economic plan for RAO UESR 
became once again evident, when Duma deputies submitted an appeal to President Putin (July 
7, 2000); they warned him that the break-up of RAO UESR into separate companies and the 
exclusive regulation of transportation tariffs would threaten the economic activity of small 
enterprises and put at risks the rights of their shareholders. The State Duma also voted for 
the enforcement of a new tariff system in the oil sector to make Russian oil companies, 
vertically integrated and structured as holdings, sell oil at the market price, and not at the 
lower domestic price.
vi    8
The regulatory role of the Federal Energy Commission was harshly criticized in the 
beginning of the most important month for Russian electricity reform, February 2003 (Satarov 
and Blagoveshenskii 2003). Deputies underscored the fact that the Regional Energy 
Commissions had increased energy tariffs 14 percent over the legal limit and therefore 
violated article 1 of the respective law.
vii  They criticized Federal Energy Commission actions 
that ordered its regional counterparts to increase domestic energy prices and abandon cross 
subsidization.
viii In their viewpoint, this decision exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the 
Federal Commission, because it was associated with deeply political implications. However, no 
law bill on energy policy in all 10 years of the Russian Duma was as contested as the law bill 
on electricity reform. Before its final approval on February 21, 2003, it received 70 
amendments (Satarov and Blagoveshenskii 2003). Centrist deputies managed to insert an 
amendment that increased the state’s controlling role during the reform period.   
The Fatherland All-Russia party leader and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who was 
aligned with Putin’s economic advisor Illarionov against Chubais, finally consented to the final 
reform project. The legislated amendments of the Russian Civil Code as well as of the Federal 
Law on Natural Monopolies constitute supplementary signals of the Duma’s final agreement 
with the presidential reform; however, they do not diminish the political significance of the 
Duma’s initial opposition to the project as well as its institutional role as the safeguard of 
Russian statehood.
ix It can be inferred that the Russian legislature perceived energy reforms 
since 1996 as an effort of Russian and foreign corporate elites to consolidate their market 
power through the politicization of energy regulation (Shakhmalov 2003: 395-397). 
In seeking to explain the regional resource dynamics of energy reform in post-Soviet 
Russia, one must bear in mind the difference between its institutional and political-economic 
dimension. The institutional dimension is connected with the formal actors involved in the 
decision-making process. The political-economic dimension of energy reform encompasses the 
regional component of energy regulation, but it also has a broader range. It must take into   9
account the multifaceted interactions of Russian deputies with influential business actors, not 
only at the local but also at the federal level; the latter usually intend to implement their own 
economic agenda by integrating their corporate strategies into larger political objectives. 
 
III. Literature and Hypotheses  
  The role of interest groups in the formation of public policy decisions reached by 
legislative institutions has been extensively analysed in the literature. As Nunez and Rosenthal 
(2004) indicate in their study on the impact of private interests and ideology on bankruptcy 
roll calls, the fear of retaliation in the form of campaign financial cuts motivated the legislators 
to support bankruptcy law bills, which boosted the financial interests of businessmen. Pro-
creditor voting implies the strong presence of deputies financed by private interests that 
benefit from it. Nevertheless, given the agnostic character of our dependent variable, ideology 
is not taken for granted in our article. Similarly, the existence of high rates in oil, gas and 
electricity production implies strong interest groups, which do not necessarily have to have 
the form of corporate organization. Adams (1996) underscores that deputies elected in multi-
member districts tend to be much more diverse in their legislative preferences than deputies 
elected in single-member districts, where the factors of party discipline and dependence are 
much stronger than regional economic interests. Adams’s observation is in line with the 
expectation one may have about the Russian electoral system and its consequences on the 
composition of the State Duma. Because 225 deputies are elected with the PR system and 225 
deputies with the SMD system, it is extremely interesting to map the conflict between local 
interest groups and party ideology in the light of Russia’s turbulent parliamentary setting. 
Furthermore, the political importance of committee membership is usually associated with the 
nature of law bills to be approved; committees involved in public works, foreign affairs, 
energy, or financial law bills are usually composed by members, who want to reap benefits for 
their constituencies and therefore increase their probability of re-election (Adler and Lapinski   10
1997: 913-914). In a study on the economic policy preferences of the transitional Chilean 
legislature, Baldez and Carey (1999) find empirical support that bargaining between deputy 
groups which support an increase in executive spending and groups which oppose it defines 
Chile’s democratic transformation. They contend that this tendency is differentiated from what 
is usually observed in post-authoritarian societies, where the executive is successful in 
increasing its political and economic rents overcoming the obstacles of formal democratic 
procedures. Carey (2003) argues that collective action among legislators requires party 
discipline and prioritization of individual over collective interests. In his view, the weakening of 
party discipline and the responsiveness of deputies to citizens’ demands is entangled with 
democratization of legislative organization and procedure. This is an observation that holds for 
the post-communist legislature of Russia; nevertheless, if deputies become business rather 
than party agents-as they used to be before-, it is very unlikely that this new constellation of 
interests is going to improve transparency and quality of democratic governance for the 
benefit of the people.  
Covington and Bargen (2004) claim that in modern democracies majority parties are 
likely to control the legislative agenda and they try to make the point that the floor-median 
member is a factor less taken into account. This is in line with what Cox and Poole argue 
(2002); party discipline is a crucial predictor of voting behaviour in all but one Congress 
between 1877 and 1999. Nevertheless, their analyses do not make any difference between 
the policy areas discussed in committee and plenary sessions. In addition, logrolling 
mechanisms in consecutive law bill readings, both in committee and plenary sessions, may 
account for the impact of regional interests on the legislators’ voting choices (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997, Fleck and Kilby 2002). As Remington argues (2006), Russian political parties 
are not characterized by uniformity in discipline and ideological cohesion. Variation in 
discipline and ideological consistency across parties of the State Duma increases the political 
cost for the formation of pro-presidential coalitions, when critical law bills are considered.   11
Electoral mandate can affect power distribution among legislators, regional businessmen 
and the executive; transfer of legislators’ incentives from voters to local interest groups 
undermines their ability to check on the political appropriateness and legitimacy of acts held 
by the public administration, as shown in the case of the Argentinean legislature (Jones et al. 
2002). The existence of ideological bias in parliamentary sessions and interest groups 
represented by deputies in those sessions is not clear and there is no indisputable empirical 
evidence in that direction (Kollman 1997). McFaul (2001) makes an interesting point when he 
says that either by liquidating the presidency and promoting a two-party system or by 
abandoning proportional representation and therefore creating a real two-party system Russia 
could find a stable path in its own party development. It is understandable that this proposal 
is very unlikely to occur, because neither Russia’s regional diversity nor its strong executive 
tradition can allow such a political and institutional outcome.  
Our approach is consistent with that of Poole and Rosenthal (1996), when they argue 
that the legislators’ voting behaviour cannot be interpreted with the median voter theorem; on 
the contrary, opportunistic party coalitions on specific roll call votes or general ideological 
constraints can be the most efficient patterns for explaining legislative behaviour in a multi-
dimensional space. In parallel, the separation of purposes presented by Samuels and Shugart 
(2003) may fit in the Russian parliamentary system. Despite the strong centralization of 
regional and local powers toward the federal centre and the perception of energy regulation as 
the main determinant of Russia’s foreign economic policy, we observe the creation of two 
different forms of accountability for the executive and the legislative branches of power. Policy 
switches occur, when the president intends to impose a law bill that comes in major conflict 
with regional interests represented in the Duma or the political career objectives of fractional 
leaders. The neutralization of legislative opposition and the fragmentation of the party spectre 
in the third term of the State Duma as argued by Smyth (2002) cannot imply any lack of 
political contestation in the Russian parliament; in key energy roll call votes where the   12
presidential administration intended to impose its own regulatory preferences in energy 
policy, there was a consistent opposition by both pro-presidential and anti-presidential parties, 
that demanded and succeeded the partial modification of the initial law bill through informal 
negotiations. In addition, energy law reform is directly not captured by policy-making 
priorities at the federal level, but it is mainly entangled with major developmental 
considerations at the regional level.  
  Talbert and Potoski (2002) are correct in finding the pre-legislative negotiations entail a 
much higher dimensionality than floor discussion and readings of the law bills.  We treat our 
dependent variable as a single-dimensional axis, whose extremes are pro- and anti-reform 
voting behaviour. Thus, given the literature described above, we come up with the following 
set of hypotheses:  
 
H1: Deputies from energy-rich constituencies are more likely to vote against energy law 
reform than deputies from energy-poor constituencies.  
  Regions with larger oil, gas and electricity production are more likely to have business 
leaders, who pursue intensive lobbying activities vis-à-vis the local political authorities. Given 
the widespread entanglement of business with formal regional leadership-both executive and 
legislative-, SMD deputies are less inclined to support any form of reform in the ownership 
status of Russia’s energy industries; their political and economic rents would then be 
substantially reduced, because involvement of foreign investors, transfer of decision-making 
processes from the regions to the federal centre and promotion of transparency in regulatory 
practices certainly undermine the control of their regional patrons over regional energy 
resources.  
H2: Deputies from oil-rich constituencies are more likely to promote gas market liberalization 
than deputies elected in gas-rich constituencies.    13
  The profiles of the oil and gas industries in Russia are crucially different. The oil 
industry was fully privatized during Duma’s first term, while Gazprom is up to this point a 
state monopoly. Thus, we contend that SMD deputies supported by oil industry interests 
would prefer the reduction of state ownership in the energy sector, because this could 
facilitate the participation of Russian and Russia-based multinationals in gas and electricity 
production. On the other hand, SMD deputies originating from regions where increased gas 
production implies a strong corporate involvement of Gazprom into regional politics are less 
inclined to support legislative initiatives advancing private sector development in Russian 
energy markets.  
 
H3: Deputies who are members of the energy legislative committee are more likely to support 
energy law reform than those who are not.   
Energy committee membership is entangled with the discussion, design and preliminary 
approval of energy law bills at the committee level. Given that the overall majority of energy 
law bills have been connected with the partial or full-scale opening of oil, gas and electricity 
markets, committee members who drafted these bills by majority voting are very likely to 
have been positive toward energy market reform during the time continuum between 1994 
and 2003. Since there is no information on committee decision-making processes, it is not 
possible to run the OC method to rank committee members based on their voting choices 
during the various energy committee sessions.  
 
IV. Research Design  
The Model 
To test whether regional conditions affect deputies voting behaviour, we propose the following 
baseline equation:    14
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where i indexes the deputies in the sample. VBi measures deputies’ voting behaviour. As each 
Duma provides a different setting influenced by the profile of energy roll call votes, we need to 
clarify the interpretation the dependent variable for all three Dumas. In the First Duma, a 
higher value can be interpreted as a stronger pro-reformist behaviour. The same also holds 
for the Third Duma. On the other hand, a higher value in the Second Duma is correlated with 
a stronger anti-reform tendency. REGi  denotes the regional conditions of a deputy. We 
measure the energy significance at the regional level with two proxies. The first is the ratio of 
the oil, gas and electricity production in every region over the aggregate quantity of oil, gas 
and electricity productions in the Russian Federation. However, to the take into account the 
population size which is especially relevant when focusing on electricity, we also measure the 
regional energy production per capita as a second proxy for regional energy significance. COMi 
is a dummy variable that distinguishes between those deputies who are members of Duma’s 
energy policy committee and those who are not (Table A2 for a list of the different 
committees).  
The regression also contains several control variables. The first set distinguishes the 
deputies according to their voting rule (electoral mandate)-either proportional representation 
or single-member district (VRi), the second set makes the distinction according to their party 
affiliation (PAi). Because the creation of ten dummy variables would be neither practical nor 
efficient, we divide the Russian political parties into three categories based on their official 
political platforms: Centre, Left and Right (see Appendix Table A1). We also create a fourth 
category for independent deputies who keep a non-party affiliated stance throughout the 
term.  Party-switching is a very powerful tool in understanding general voting dynamics at the 
legislative level (PSi). Energy law bills, because of their crucial political weight, have been in 
the epicentre of fierce inter- and intraparty contestations and therefore the cause of party   15
dissolutions; the floating ideological character of the Russian party system can account for 
these developments. The governmental efforts to dismantle Gazprom during the second term 
of the Russian Duma combined with the restructuring of RAO UESR, which caused a serious 
clash within the pro-presidential party coalition, redefined the party map of the Russian Duma. 
Controlling for the impact of these radical changes is certainly enlightening the regional 
economic dimensions of energy regulation, since it indicates the extensions of regional 
economic constraints in Russia’s federal parliamentary politics. The demographic variables 
(DEMi: age and gender) may also have policy implications on the way age and gender 
differences react ceteris paribus to pro-reform energy bills. It also helps to measure the 
heterogeneity of the deputies. Finally, εi denotes the error term.  
 
Data Evaluation Process   
This paper examines the voting behaviour of Duma members on energy roll call votes in 
the Russian Duma between 1994 and 2003. Our research would not have been possible 
without the roll call database of INDEM Foundation in Moscow (Satarov and Blagoveshenskii 
2003). Roll calls covered the three first post-communist terms of the Russian Duma (1994-
1995, 1996-1999 and 2000-2003). Three respective roll call matrices were created including 
the binary choices of each deputy. The first roll call matrix included 51, the second 196 and 
the third 202 votes. Following Poole’s methodology (Poole 2005), we set 0.5 percent as the 
minimum proportion on the minority side of a roll call. Furthermore, we define 10 as the 
minimum number of roll calls in which a deputy has to participate in order to be included in 
the scaling.x The data assigns a unique number to every deputy and provides information on 
his party affiliation, the electoral system he was elected on and his regional origin, if he was 
elected on the SMD system. The Russian Constitution mentions explicitly that the State Duma 
must have 450 members. For each of the three terms the database contains more than 450 
deputies, because some deputies were obliged by natural or legal reasons to abdicate their   16
parliamentary membership. The majority of them resigned to take another public office 
which by the 1993 Constitution is incompatible with a legislator’s seat.  
Our goal is to analyse the relative importance of regional factors on deputies’ 
behaviour, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandates, 
committee membership and demographic factors.  The objective of this section is to study the 
role of energy resources as determinants of energy regulation. The INDEM database provides 
information on the regional origin of SMD deputies, because regional affiliation is not deemed 
to be politically important for deputies elected on a PR basis. We use two proxies to evaluate 
the energy significance of Russian regions, namely the ratios of the oil, gas and electricity 
production in every region over the aggregate quantity of oil, gas and electricity productions 
in Russian Federation and the regional oil, gas and electricity production per capita.
xi In 
parallel, the role of party labels in regional energy politics is explained in terms of political 
development and state organization. Given that the consistent and active participation of 
Communists in local elections and the differing principles between gubernatorial and regional 
legislative elections (Hutcheson 2003: 35-37), it might be helpful to model the multifaceted 
interactions between political actors and energy entrepreneurs in energy-rich and energy-poor 
Russian regions. Fluid boundaries between business and government and endemic phenomena 
of political corruption synthesize a challenging matrix of interest equilibriums and institutional 
players, both in federal and the regional economic policy planning.    
To do this we consider an empirical approach based on the optimal classification 
method elaborated by Poole (1997). This method allows us to introduce a probabilistic spatial 
model for the analysis of roll call votes on oil, gas and electricity regulation.  Given that the 
optimal classification model is a non-parametric method, there is no metric information on the 
legislators’ ideal points produced (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004: 622). Poole and Rosenthal’s 
model of Nominate Scores is the conceptual foundation for explaining the optimal classification 
method, since it constitutes its parametric alternative. The hypothesis that roll call voting can   17
be captured both by a single and a two-dimensional analysis is valid for both models of 
deputies (Poole 1997: 70-85). Nevertheless, Poole’s non-parametric approach is less 
influenced by single classification errors in the legislators’ ideal points. His concern is to stress 
the ideological underpinnings of legislative behaviour based on a metrically unbiased method 
that does not consider the strategic calculus of party coalitions to be in the core of 
parliamentary politics.  The roll call votes focus exclusively on oil, gas and electricity 
regulation. The optimal classification method has the objective of locating ideal points for 
legislators and separating hyper planes for roll calls such that the number of classification 
errors is minimized. A classification error for a legislator on a roll call occurs when the 
legislator’s ideal point is such that his or her vote is not in line with the separating hyper plane 
for the roll call. In addition, the optimal classification method counts equally all classification 
errors (Rosenthal and Voeten 2004: 622). Its single-dimensional ranking is divided into four 
distinct orders (from 1 to 4) and is regressed on of several control variables. 
  In addition, because the inclusion of our aggregated regional variables will produce 
downwardly biased standard errors, we address the problem of heteroskedasticity by 
presenting standard errors adjusted for clustering on Russian regions (see Figures A1 and A2, 
and Table A2 and A3). The advantage of this class of estimators is that they do not require a 
precise modelling of the heteroskedasticity source. Therefore, they are robust to 
heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form. In general, cluster estimators tend to increase the 
reported standard errors by a relatively large amount, which reduces the levels of statistical 
significance for the estimated coefficients without affecting the marginal effects and the size of 
the coefficients.  
The calculation of marginal effects is pivotal for the success of our analysis. Ordered 
probit models analyse the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. The equation 
of a (ordered) probit estimation has a non-linear form; only the sign of the coefficient can be   18
directly interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method 
to find the quantitative effect a variable has on the dependent variable.  
It is interesting that there is no Duma representative for the republic of Chechnya; this 
is why we count one state less than the official number of the Russian federal subjects. On the 
contrary, there are deputies representing all seven Russian administrative districts.  We have 
to stress here that PR deputies have been coded as 0 in the regional factor variables; as their 
election is dependent on the party’s percentage on an all-Russian electoral basis, it is not 
methodologically consistent to assume their connection with energy interest groups in certain 
regions with higher or lower rates of oil, gas or electricity production. In a second step we are 
only going to work with the sub-sample of members elected from SMDs.  Focusing only on 
SMDs allows checking the robustness of the previous results. Moreover, to better evaluate the 
importance of energy resources we will conduct for every estimation a Wald-test for coefficient 
restrictions testing for joint significance to be able to conclude whether energy resources as a 
group play a significant role in the determination of Poole’s ranking. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
We present the empirical results focusing independently on the First Duma (Table 1 and 
2), Second Duma (Table 3 and 4) and Third Duma (Table 5 and 6) working with the whole 
sample (Table 1, 3, 5) and the SMD’s sub-sample (Table 2, 4, 6). In every table we report 
estimations with standard errors adjusted for clustering on Russian regions
xii  and estimations 
with the two different proxies of regional energy relevance. We also present specifications 
without the electricity variable due to low values when working with the per capita values.  
 
a) First Duma 
The significant role of energy resources is supported in the first two tables when looking 
at the chi2-statistics showing that the null hypothesis is rejected in most of the cases at the   19
1% significance levels, which means that energy resources have a significant effect on 
deputies’ behaviour in the First Duma. The marginal effects are also quite substantial. This 
result supports our first hypothesis. The changing signs of oil and gas factors in Table 1 
(where regional production is measured as percentage of the regional production for both SMD 
and PR deputies), combined with their strong statistical significance also confirms our second 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the statistical insignificance of the oil factor in Table 2 and the last 
estimations in Table 1 (when we proxy regional energy resources as regional production per 
capita and in Table 2), together with the robust statistical significance of the natural gas factor 
in both tables leads to the following conclusion; Chernomyrdin’s solid Gazprom leadership and 
subsequent Prime Ministership of Russian Federation (1992-1998) provided the company’s 
privatization process with a major institutional backup and strong selection bias as indicated in 
the organization of closed auctions so that the participation of only specific bidders is ensured. 
Chernomyrdin’s heavy influence on Gazprom’s corporate governance procedures, particular 
through his ties with Rem Viakhirev, the newly appointed Gazprom’s Chairman, can explain 
why the pro-gas governmental coalition in the first Duma term has a consistent voting 
behaviour and confirms the Prime Minister’s strategic decision to partially privatize Gazprom, 
while keeping the state as the main corporate shareholder. There is no doubt that 
Chernomyrdin can be classified as the leading energy politics figure of the first Duma term; 
the continuous statistical significance of the gas factor quantifies this observation.  
The high statistical significance of the Committee variable combined with the high 
marginal effects indicates that members of the energy parliamentary committee of the First 
Duma are more likely to vote pro-reform bills as opposed to the others. Thus, hypothesis 3 
cannot be rejected. The appointment of the energy committee members should certainly not 
be deemed to be incidental and the outcome of oil industry privatization in early 1990s is the 
clearest indication for that.  
   20
b) Second Duma 
  The results in Table 3 and 4 underscore that the origin from an energy-rich or energy-
poor Russian region did play an important role in the voting choices of deputies, but only with 
respect to the oil and gas sectors; the coefficients of oil and gas production are statistically 
significant only when we proxy energy production as regional per capita production; this 
finding is also supported by the Wald-test. Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected in these 
specifications. A potential interpretation of this result is linked with the evolution of Gazprom-
Government relations in the aftermath of Chernomyrdin’s firing from Prime Ministership in 
1998, amidst Duma’s second term. Gazprom lost its governmental support, and it was 
suddenly obliged to pay huge amounts of taxes to avoid the confiscation of its property. It is 
obvious that the regional per capita production proxy captures the peripheral dimension of 
energy resources in a more solid way, both at the aggregate and the SMD sub-sample level; 
thus, it helps in the direct quantification of the linkage between regional energy security and 
re-election incentives held by SMD deputies. The strong statistical significance of the gas 
production factor accounts for the strong and positive legislative support to Gazprom’s 
consolidated state character, contrary to governmental proposals, instigated by the IMF and 
the World Bank Group. The occurrence of intense legislative debates with major initiatives 
from both sides led to a final compromise; Gazprom finally paid its tax debts, but it also 
stayed under state control. The equally strong anti-reform tendency in the oil production 
factor reflects the legislative majority’s rejection of Rosneft and Slavneft privatization 
proposals as an outcome of the previous oil privatization experience in the early 1990s.  
The Committee membership determinant is only statistically significant when we focus 
on the SMD sub-sample. However, it has a negative sign, which is consistent with the first 
Duma, when we taking into account the different interpretation of the dependent variable.  It 
is likely that the composition of the energy committee confirms our contention that members 
of the energy legislative committee are more likely to support oil and gas market reform bills   21
than non-members; however, energy market reform should not be considered to be 
identical with energy market liberalization in this particular legislative setting. During its 
second term, the Duma aimed at restoring Gazprom’s financial accountability and in parallel 
maintaining the majority of its shares under state control. This double goal is captured by the 
committee membership variable as well and is aligned with the last of our initial research 
hypotheses.  
 
c) Third Duma 
The political contestation over electricity reform in the Third Duma and the divided 
stance of Russian centrist parties can substantially explain the high statistical significance of 
the gas production variable. Surprisingly enough, the electricity production variable is 
statistically insignificant no matter what regional resources proxy or deputies sample we use. 
The divide of the pro-governmental coalition over the RAO UESR reform and the role of 
Anatolii Chubais are certainly reflected in the statistical output, as the electricity production 
factor for the voting decisions of SMD deputies remains statistically insignificant. The support 
of the RAO UESR reform by SMD deputies originating from gas-rich regions makes perfect 
sense, since UESR liberalization and the subsequent increase of electricity prices would 
optimize the profits of regional businessmen with a strong commercial presence in the gas 
industry. Therefore, in line with First Duma, the gas factor seems to significantly affect 
deputies voting behaviour located in the pro-reform component of the single dimensional axis. 
Moreover, in line with previous findings we observe a support of our first hypothesis when 
focusing on the per capita energy proxies.  
The Committee factor is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but only in the 
SMD sub-sample; in any case, it is still less strong than in the First Duma. A possible 
explanation for that may be again Luzhkov’s opposition to Anatolii Chubais’s restructuring plan 
of RAO UESR and subsequently to President Putin. Nevertheless, the majority of SMD   22
deputies, who were energy committee members, supported the RAO UESR reform, both in 
the committee discussions and in the plenary sessions. Moreover, here can be no major 
conclusion for the energy committee factor at the aggregate level. Lesser representation in 
membership or inconsistent voting attitudes may well account for the variable statistical 
significance of this determinant between the aggregate and SMD sub-sample levels.  
d) Control Variables 
  Taking a look at the ideology and coherence as attributes of energy market reforms, we 
can conclude that the results in the First Duma indicate that there are statistically significant 
differences between Leftist and Rightist deputies. Left oriented deputies seemed to have 
stronger anti-reform policy preferences than the right oriented ones. As a consequence, it may 
be concluded that right deputies in 1994 and 1995 are more likely to support the presidential 
agenda and vote for rather than against regulatory and ownership reform in the energy 
sector.  The single dimensional axis in the first Duma has the following ideological sequence: 
Right > Independent > Center > Left. The Second Duma shows an inversed direction of 
the ideological factor signs, which are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level: Left > 
Right > Independent > Center. Interestingly enough, the Party Change variable is now 
highly statistical significant independently of the energy production proxy and the sample we 
use. The ideology coefficients in the Third Duma are also statistically significant at the 1 
percent level and have the following ranking: Right > Independent > Center > Left. This 
impressive ordering of ideology factors throughout the three Duma terms does not reverse the 
argument that in Russia there is no single-dimensional Right-Left axis.   
It seems that in the First Duma SMD deputies are more likely to maintain a higher 
position in Poole’s single dimensional ranking, because the SMD coefficient is statistically 
significant; during the first years of the transition they advocate oil and gas market reform to 
increase their political and economic rents both at the federal and the regional level. In the 
Second Duma SMD deputies are more likely than PR deputies to vote for bills introducing   23
energy market reform, which means in the specific legislative context that they support the 
social and state character of Gazprom and block its disintegration plans supported by the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. This last effort caused the reaction of a strong 
interparty SMD alliance, which saw a potential vertical increase in domestic gas prices as a 
direct threat posed against their re-election probability. On the other hand, the negative 
coefficient of the SMD factor in the Third Duma indicates an anti-reform direction. SMD 
deputies are less inclined to advocate the restructuring of RAO UESR than PR deputies, 
because the proposed reform lessens the power of Regional Energy Commissions and, 
therefore, their political impact on electricity pricing. 
Taking a look at the socio-demographic factors we can conclude that gender differences 
are observable, particularly in the First and the Third Duma. In both terms, women seemed to 
have a more pro-reformist legislative behaviour than men. The elderly Russian elites are 
inclined to support the executive’s legislative initiatives for changing the ownership structure 
of Gazprom in the First Duma term, although the sign is inversed at the 10 percent 
significance level, when we use the SMD sub-sample. Contrary to the First Duma, in the 
Second Duma we clearly observe a linear relationship between age and anti-reform legislative 
choices. This is also the case for the Third Duma.  
 
e) Case Studies  
In this last part of our empirical analysis we intend to check the validity of our 
aggregate estimations by running a similar estimation structure as previously using probit 
models for individual roll votes. This method enables us not only to understand the 
underpinnings of our previous results at the micro-legislative level, but also to test whether 
the individual estimations for crucial roll votes in each of the three first terms of Russia’s 
democratic transition confirm or contradict the broader findings located in previous parts of 
the article. What we do is to analyze the two most crucial roll call votes during these ten   24
years: roll call vote No. 46300
xiii on the ownership status of Gazprom and roll call vote No. 
129940 on the restructuring of RAO UESR. Table 7 and 8 present the results of both roll call 
votes. For simplicity, we only report the results of the energy variables. However, we control 
for all other factors in the regressions.   
  The results of the roll call vote No. 46300 indicate that deputies coming from oil-rich 
regions are less inclined to support Gazprom as opposed to deputies coming from gas-rich 
regions. It seems that regional policies are certainly crucial at the individual level, which is 
less the case at the aggregate level. The break-up of Gazprom and the opening of the Russian 
gas market to foreign investors provoked a tremendous conflict of interests among deputies 
from fractions and regions with often contradictory interests. The State Duma’s successful 
support of Gazprom’s state character is an ample indicator that, despite the presidential 
initiative and vested regional interests, the collective legislative choice of the deputies was 
aligned with a firm notion of statehood, which is apparent throughout Russian economic 
history.   
  Moreover, in the results of roll call No. 129940 it is not a surprise to observe that 
deputies coming from electricity-rich regions would be very likely to support this law bill, since 
it was the outcome of long debates and hard negotiations, both formal and informal; in any 
case, the policy impact of the RAO UESR reform was going to affect analogously the 
regulatory power of their local energy commission. Although not reported, it is also worthwhile 
to note that we were not able observe that committee membership matters.  Thus, it is 
evident that the composition of the committee that prepared both law bills was biased.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
  Our goal was to analyse the relative importance of energy factors on the legislative 
behaviour of Russian deputies, controlling for other factors such as ideology and party 
affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic factors.  We   25
have therefore intensively investigated empirically the role of energy resources as 
determinants of energy regulation using a new data set that has not been explored so far in 
the literature covering none less than three Dumas covering also a rich set of control 
variables. This allows investigating the impact of regional conditions in a dynamic 
environment. Moreover, we provide a novel approach based on a rich set of roll calls.  
We observe that energy resource factors did affect deputies voting choices. On the 
other hand, we also find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public 
policy priorities of the federal centre that continue to set the tone in energy market reform in 
post-Soviet Russia. At that point, the question whether State Duma can act as a real 
representative of people’s interests becomes profound. The critical significance of the gas 
production factor, measured both from a federal and regional standpoint, in all three Dumas 
reveals the strong institutional connection – both formal and informal - between Gazprom and 
SMD deputies from gas-rich regions. This is an extremely interesting conclusion, since it 
provides an added regional dimension to the already known Gazprom’s political ties at the 
level of federal politics. Our first hypothesis does not generally hold in the light of the 
empirical evidence provided in this article; in all Dumas SMD deputies from energy-rich 
regions were more inclined to support by majority legislative proposals on energy market 
reform. The variable significance of the oil production factor between 1994 and 2003 does 
allow a solid conclusion on the antithetic nature of oil and gas industry interests at the 
regional level. Nevertheless, the energy committee membership is indeed a predictive factor 
for the positive stance of a deputy vis-à-vis an energy market law bill.  
With respect to the control variables, we conclude that there is no Left-Right ideological 
axis in the political economy of Russia’s energy market reform. Second, the pro-and anti-
reform poles observed in the single dimensional scale we used in all three Dumas are not 
necessarily connected with liberal and state-oriented conservative policies respectively. This 
may be the case for the First and the Third Duma, but it is not the case for the Second Duma.   26
The disentanglement of reform from the standard free market approach is an interesting 
aspect partially provided by this article. In general, deputies are likely to establish bonds of 
interdependence with regional monopolists and other entrepreneurs, given that the latter can 
financially support their electoral campaigns. Nevertheless, the strong statistical significance 
of ideology factors in all three Dumas combined with the absence of consistent Left-Right axis 
shows that Russian political parties grouped across the traditional ideological lines may not be 
credible in terms of ideological honesty; however, they are indeed credible and predictable as 
interest groups pursuing a specific policy set, which maximizes the welfare of their members. 
If personal interests are more important than parties, it is worthwhile to figure out what the 
role of the former in the evolutionary course of party institutions.  
The argument that Russia under Yeltsin and Putin administrations has evolved to an 
electoral monarchy {Shevtsova 2000} does not hold in the light of the quantitative analysis 
presented above. The State Duma may be regarded as an institution with a two-fold 
orientation: it is both a state organ and, in parallel, a political actor maintaining strong 
institutional ties with energy business. Corporate developments in the Russian oil sector 
combined with the ongoing reform planning for Gazprom and RAO UESR necessitated 
interparty and interregional coalitions, if not for the promotion of a common energy agenda, 
at least for the prevention of reform projects, which would be unfavourable to regional energy 
monopolies and cause popular disapprobation. Collective strategies cover a larger set of 
objectives and have an increased probability of success.  
Another problem is that defining the notion of workable competition in Russian energy 
markets has not been an easy case. In the Russian context the establishment of competitive 
market structures is not connected only with the issue of potential market entry as opposed to 
narrower standards used in the past to classify market concentration (Ellig and Kalt 1996: 
117-118). It refers to concrete private players whose market entry is the outcome of a 
privileged relationship with state officials. It is correct that no regulatory regime can remove   27
all inefficiencies: however, its performance can be improved uniquely, if corporate and 
public actors are given incentives to reduce public and private costs in the energy industry and 
thus boost people’s welfare. Thus, the Russian Duma acts as a de facto regulator by 
contributing to the implementation of a transparent tariff-setting system and the promotion of 
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Determinants of Energy Reform in the First Duma  
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 Oil   5.446***  3.75  -1.688  -0.483  0.589  1.583                  
Gas  -3.570***  -3.88  1.107  0.317  -0.386  -1.038                  




                        
  Oil            3.472  0.61  -1.076  -0.308 0.373  1.011  6.584  1.55  -2.042 -0.583 0.707  1.919 
Gas          2.532***  3.81  -0.785  -0.225  0.272 0.738 2.410***  3.69 -0.747 -0.214 0.259  0.702 
Electricity          13702  0.76  -4248  -1217  1473  3991          
Committee  0.468***  3.46  -0.123 -0.059 0.027  0.156 0.507***  3.61 -0.131  -0.065  0.026 0.170 0.512***  3.63 -0.132  -0.066  0.026 0.172 
SMD  0.382***  4.32  -0.118 -0.034 0.040  0.111 0.265**  2.32 -0.082  -0.023  0.028 0.077 0.336*** 3.57  -0.104  -0.030  0.035  0.098 
Centre  -0.711*** -3.93  0.216 0.061 -0.071  -0.207 -0.732***  -4.16 0.223  0.063  -0.072 -0.214 -0.741***  -4.06 0.225  0.064  -0.073 -0.216 
Independent  -0.512*  -1.66  0.181 0.014 -0.075 -0.120 -0.477  -1.53 0.167  0.015  -0.069 -0.114 -0.500  -1.61 0.177  0.014  -0.073 -0.118 
Right  0.197*  1.85  -0.059 -0.020 0.019  0.060 0.173  1.59 -0.052  -0.017  0.017 0.052 0.170  1.51 -0.051  -0.017  0.016 0.051 
Woman  0.463***  3.68  -0.125 -0.056 0.030  0.151 0.500***  3.71 -0.133  -0.062  0.030 0.165 0.493***  3.86 -0.132  -0.061  0.030 0.162 
Age  0.009*  1.78  -0.003 -0.001 0.001  0.002 0.008*  1.67 -0.003  -0.001  0.001 0.002 0.008* 1.68  -0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.002 
Party Change  0.159  1.31  -0.048  -0.015  0.016 0.047 0.220  1.46 -0.066  -0.022  0.021 0.067 0.211  1.44 -0.063  -0.021  0.020 0.064 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 
23.30***            199.06***                 153.13***                
Number  of  obs  400          400          400         
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.051                 0.048                 0.048                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Zero party switches for Independent.  Reference groups: PR; Left, 
Man, Not changed the party, Not a member of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.03959 
(4%) in error proportion, to 0.96041 (96%) in correct classification, to 0.66202 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates 




Determinants of Energy Reform in the First Duma (sub-sample of members elected from SMDs) 
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  Oil    -1.838  -1.57  0.381  0.090  -0.386  -0.085                       
Gas  1.245**  2.20  -0.258  -0.061  0.262  0.057                       




                             
  Oil            -1.228  -0.32  0.254  0.062  -0.259 -0.057 -3.290  -1.23 0.681 0.166 -0.694  -0.153 
Gas          1.213***  3.43  -0.251  -0.061  0.256 0.056 1.394***  5.62 -0.289 -0.070 0.294  0.065 
Electricity          -8971  -0.76  1854  451  -1892  -414          
Committee  0.836**  2.46  -0.115 -0.158 0.195  0.078 0.808**  2.23 -0.112  -0.151  0.189 0.074 0.806**  2.24 -0.112  -0.151  0.189 0.074 
Centre 2.628***  7.17  -0.702  0.226  0.359  0.118 2.663***  7.25 -0.710  0.227 0.362 0.120 2.649***  7.20 -0.707  0.226 0.361 0.120 
Independent 2.247***  4.51  -0.134  -0.600  0.199 0.535 2.336***  4.14 -0.134 -0.615 0.179  0.569  2.300***  4.10 -0.134  -0.609  0.186 0.557 
Right  3.091***  6.84  -0.150 -0.682 0.028  0.804 3.125***  6.94 -0.149  -0.684  0.021 0.812 3.099***  6.85 -0.149  -0.682  0.025 0.806 
Woman  0.546*  1.81  -0.086 -0.082 0.127  0.041 0.504  1.64 -0.081  -0.073  0.117 0.036 0.515* 1.70  -0.082  -0.076  0.120  0.038 
Age  -0.017  -1.60  0.004 0.001 -0.004  -0.001  -0.018* -1.73  0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001  -0.018* -1.73  0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
Party Change  0.465*  1.90  -0.080  -0.057  0.106 0.030 0.428*  1.75 -0.074  -0.050  0.098 0.027 0.429*  1.75 -0.075  -0.051  0.098 0.027 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 
4.89                 36.52***                 35.56***                
Number  of  obs  233          233          233         
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.325                 0.325                 0.325                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Zero party switches for Independent.  Reference groups: Left, Man, 
Not changed the party, Not a member of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.03959 (4%) in 
error proportion, to 0.96041 (96%) in correct classification, to 0.66202 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the 





Determinants of Energy Reform in the Second Duma  



















Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg.  Marg.  Marg.  Marg. 


































                                
  Oil    0.560  0.73  -0.113  -0.111  0.124  0.099                  
Gas  0.248  0.45  -0.050  -0.049  0.055  0.044                  




                        
  Oil            8.262**  2.58  -1.666  -1.630 1.833  1.463  7.359***  3.75  -1.484 -1.452 1.633  1.303 
Gas          -1.779***  -2.62  0.359  0.351  -0.395 -0.315 -1.740**  -2.57 0.351 0.343 -0.386  -0.308 
Electricity          -4379  -0.35  883  864  -972  -775          
Committee  -0.202  -0.60  0.045 0.035 -0.048  -0.032 -0.184  -0.54 0.041  0.032  -0.044 -0.029 -0.187  -0.55 0.041  0.033  -0.045 -0.030 
SMD  -0.269**  -2.03  0.054 0.053 -0.059  -0.048 -0.174  -1.48 0.035  0.034  -0.038 -0.031 -0.194** -2.02  0.039  0.038  -0.043  -0.035 
Centre  -2.467*** -5.84  0.596 0.176 -0.378  -0.395 -2.459***  -5.85 0.595  0.176  -0.378 -0.393 -2.459***  -5.84 0.595  0.176  -0.378 -0.393 
Independent -2.683***  -4.73  0.820  -0.275  -0.421 -0.123 -2.595***  -4.59 0.805  -0.264 -0.419 -0.122 -2.597***  -4.60 0.806  -0.265 -0.419 -0.122 
Right  -1.233*** -4.37  0.380 0.036 -0.301  -0.115 -1.230***  -4.40 0.379  0.036  -0.300 -0.115 -1.229***  -4.39 0.378  0.037  -0.300 -0.115 
Woman  0.067  0.48  -0.013 -0.014 0.014  0.012 0.060  0.43 -0.012  -0.012  0.013 0.011 0.060  0.43 -0.012  -0.012  0.013 0.011 
Age  0.012*  1.94  -0.002 -0.002 0.003  0.002 0.012**  1.97 -0.002  -0.002  0.003 0.002 0.012** 1.98  -0.002  -0.002  0.003  0.002 
Party Change  0.731***  6.41  -0.113  -0.165 0.110  0.168  0.746***  6.34  -0.115 -0.168 0.111 0.172 0.746***  6.33 -0.115  -0.168  0.112 0.172 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 
4.30            24.57***                 23.77***                
Number  of  obs  464          464          464         
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.280                 0.280                 0.280                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: PR; Left, Man, Not changed the party, Not a 
member of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.04288 (4.3%) in error proportion, to 0.95712 
(95.7%) in correct classification, to 0.53441 (53.44%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the previous iteration 





Determinants of Energy Reform in the Second Duma (sub-sample of members elected from SMDs) 



















Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg. Marg.  Marg. Marg.  Marg.  Marg.  Marg. 


































                        
  Oil    0.355  0.52  -0.089  -0.051  0.080  0.060                  
Gas  0.076  0.17  -0.019  -0.011  0.017  0.013                  




                        
  Oil            5.287*  1.75  -1.326  -0.759 1.195  0.890  4.740***  3.46  -1.189 -0.681 1.071  0.798 
Gas          -1.870***  -3.25  0.469  0.269  -0.423 -0.315 -1.856***  -3.23 0.466 0.267 -0.419  -0.313 
Electricity          -2652  -0.20  665  381  -599  -447          
Committee  -0.745**  -2.16  0.239 0.021 -0.180  -0.081 -0.725**  -2.04 0.232  0.022  -0.176 -0.079 -0.729**  -2.03 0.234  0.022  -0.176 -0.079 
Centre  -1.870*** -8.01  0.495 0.140 -0.330  -0.305 -1.867***  -8.01 0.495  0.138  -0.330 -0.303 -1.866***  -8.06 0.495  0.138  -0.330 -0.303 
Independent -2.365***  -4.64  0.763  -0.253  -0.377 -0.133 -2.297***  -4.43 0.749  -0.244 -0.374 -0.131 -2.298***  -4.44 0.749  -0.245 -0.374 -0.131 
Right -1.006***  -3.62  0.348  -0.029  -0.232  -0.086 -1.029***  -3.70 0.357  -0.034 -0.237 -0.086 -1.022***  -3.73 0.354  -0.033 -0.235 -0.086 
Woman  0.020  0.12  -0.005 -0.003 0.004  0.003 0.015  0.09 -0.004  -0.002  0.003 0.003 0.015  0.09 -0.004  -0.002  0.003 0.003 
Age  0.016  1.60  -0.004 -0.002 0.004  0.003 0.016  1.59 -0.004  -0.002  0.004 0.003 0.016 1.60  -0.004  -0.002  0.004  0.003 
Party Change  0.754***  4.07  -0.151  -0.142 0.128  0.166  0.773***  4.08  -0.155 -0.145 0.130 0.170 0.772***  4.07 -0.155  -0.145  0.130 0.170 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 
2.34                 25.26***                 25.64***                
Number  of  obs  238          238          238         
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.225                 0.225                 0.225                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: Left, Man, Not changed the party, Not a member of 
Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.04288 (4.3%) in error proportion, to 0.95712 (95.7%) in 
correct classification, to 0.53441 (53.44%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the previous iteration estimates 




Determinants of Energy Reform in the Third Duma  
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  Oil    -1.427  -1.34  0.264  0.229  -0.341  -0.152                  
Gas  0.923*  1.81  -0.171  -0.148  0.220  0.098                  




                        
  Oil            -0.346  -0.09  0.064  0.056  -0.083 -0.037 -3.421  -1.28 0.634 0.547 -0.817  -0.364 
Gas          0.941***  2.82  -0.174  -0.151  0.225 0.100 1.213***  5.65 -0.225 -0.194 0.290  0.129 
Electricity          -13395  -1.18  2473  2148  -3202  -1420          
Committee  0.395  1.64  -0.059 -0.087 0.092  0.055 0.376  1.53 -0.057  -0.082  0.088 0.051 0.372  1.52 -0.056  -0.081  0.087 0.051 
SMD  -0.795*** -4.84  0.149 0.120 -0.181  -0.088 -0.744***  -4.85 0.139  0.114  -0.171 -0.082 -0.821***  -6.76 0.154  0.124  -0.187 -0.091 
Centre  3.323***  8.43  -0.760 -0.029 0.393  0.396 3.324***  8.45 -0.760  -0.029  0.394 0.395 3.311***  8.34 -0.758  -0.029  0.393 0.394 
Independent  2.819***  5.55  -0.112 -0.589 -0.128 0.829  2.872***  5.54  -0.112 -0.591 -0.136 0.839  2.824***  5.39  -0.112 -0.589 -0.129 0.830 
Right 3.170***  11.47  -0.188  -0.615 -0.057 0.859  3.174***  11.60  -0.188 -0.615 -0.057 0.860  3.160***  11.33  -0.188 -0.614 -0.056 0.857 
Woman  0.360  1.47  -0.055 -0.078 0.084  0.049 0.343  1.42 -0.052  -0.074  0.080 0.046 0.354  1.48 -0.054  -0.077  0.083 0.048 
Age  -0.014*** -3.06  0.003 0.002 -0.003  -0.001 -0.014***  -3.14 0.003  0.002  -0.003 -0.001 -0.014***  -3.15 0.003  0.002  -0.003 -0.001 
Party Change  0.259***  2.09  -0.043  -0.051 0.061  0.032  0.264**  2.13  -0.043 -0.052 0.063 0.033 0.263**  2.12 -0.043  -0.052  0.062 0.033 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 
3.93                 49.96***                 45.52***                
Number  of  obs  466          466          466         
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.360                 0.361                 0.360                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: PR; Left, Man, Not changed the party, Not a 
member of Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.02905 (3%) in error proportion, to 0.97095 
(97%) in correct classification, to 0.87064 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the previous iteration estimates 




Determinants of Energy Reform in the Third Duma (sub-sample of members elected from SMDs) 
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 Oil   -1.838  -1.57  0.381 0.090 -0.386  -0.085                        
Gas  1.245**  2.20  -0.258 -0.061 0.262  0.057                        
Electricity  4.012  0.65  -0.831 -0.197 0.843  0.185                        
Regional 
production per 
capita               
                
 Oil           -1.228  -0.32  0.254  0.062  -0.259  -0.057 -3.290  -1.23 0.681  0.166  -0.694 -0.153 
Gas          1.213***  3.43  -0.251  -0.061  0.256 0.056 1.394***  5.62 -0.289 -0.070 0.294  0.065 
Electricity          -8971  -0.76  1854  451  -1892  -414          
Committee  0.836**  2.46  -0.115 -0.158 0.195  0.078  0.808** 2.23  -0.112  -0.151  0.189  0.074  0.806** 2.24  -0.112  -0.151  0.189  0.074 
Centre  2.628*** 7.17  -0.702  0.226  0.359  0.118  2.663***  7.25 -0.710  0.227 0.362 0.120 2.649***  7.20 -0.707  0.226 0.361 0.120 
Independent 2.247***  4.51  -0.134  -0.600  0.199 0.535 2.336***  4.14 -0.134 -0.615 0.179  0.569  2.300***  4.10 -0.134  -0.609  0.186 0.557 
Right  3.091***  6.84  -0.150 -0.682 0.028  0.804  3.125*** 6.94  -0.149  -0.684  0.021  0.812  3.099*** 6.85  -0.149  -0.682  0.025  0.806 
Woman  0.546*  1.81  -0.086 -0.082 0.127  0.041  0.504 1.64  -0.081  -0.073  0.117  0.036  0.515* 1.70  -0.082  -0.076  0.120  0.038 
Age  -0.017  -1.60  0.004 0.001 -0.004  -0.001  -0.018* -1.73  0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001  -0.018* -1.73  0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
Party Change  0.465*  1.90  -0.080 -0.057 0.106  0.030  0.428* 1.75  -0.074  -0.050  0.098  0.027  0.429* 1.75  -0.075  -0.051  0.098  0.027 
chi2-stat energy 
resources 4.89 
              
36.52*** 
              
35.56*** 
              
Number of obs  233           233           233          
Prob>chi2  0.000           0.000           0.000          
Pseudo R2  0.325                 0.325                 0.325                
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Reference groups: Left, Man, Not changed the party, Not a member of 
Duma’s energy policy committee. According to the Optimal Classification output, the algorithm converges to 0.02905 (3%) in error proportion, to 0.97095 (97%) in 
correct classification, to 0.87064 (66.2%) in APRE, and the Spearman correlation between the current legislator estimates and the previous iteration estimates converges 





Probit Analysis of Roll Call Votes (No. 46300) 










Regional production as 
percentage of national 
production 
          
  Oil    426.503**  2.26  0.068        
Gas  -283.973**  -2.32  -0.045        
Electricity  -13.987  -0.99  -0.002        
Regional production per capita            
 Oil         271.971**  1.99 12.848  313.285*  1.90 13.982 
Gas      -67.014  -0.87  -3.166  -73.593  -0.99  -3.284 
Electricity      49342  0.91  2331     
all  other  variables  included  YES    YES    YES    
chi2-stat energy resources  6.10        5.36        3.77       
Number  of  obs  342    342    342    
Pseudo R2  0.485        0.476        0.471       
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Reference groups: PR; All 

















Probit Analysis of Roll Call Votes (No. 129940) 










Regional production as 
percentage of national 
production 
         
  Oil    10.187  1.06  3.771        
Gas  -1.271  -0.98  -0.470        
Electricity  17.329***  3.17  6.414        
Regional production per capita           
  Oil          43.543 0.75  16.134 51.473 0.94  19.143 
Gas        -1.465 -0.33  -0.543 -2.226 -0.52  -0.828 
Electricity     50076***  2.67  18554     
all  other  variables  included  YES    YES    YES    
chi2-stat energy resources  11.96***        18.43***        8.42**       
Number  of  obs  414    414    414    
Pseudo R2  0.312        0.310        0.299       
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Reference groups: PR; All 









Political Parties in the State Duma of Russia between 1994 and 2003 
 
First Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Choice of Russia  Right 
Women of Russia  Centre 
Agrarian Party of Russia  Left 
Block “Yavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin”  Centre 
Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Deputy Group "Russia"  Centre 
Deputy Group "Stability"  Centre 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
New Regional Policy -Duma 96  Centre 
Party of Russian Unity and Agreement  Right 
Not affiliated with a fraction or grouping  Independent  
  
Second Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Our Home-Russia  Centre 
Yabloko Centre 
Agrarian Deputy Group  Left 
Deputy Group "People's Power"  Left 
Deputy Group "Russian Regions"  Centre 
Not affiliated with a fraction or grouping  Independent  
  
Third Duma    
Political Parties  Proclaimed Ideology 
Communist Party of Russia  Left 
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia  Right 
Fatherland-All Russia  Centre 
Union of Right Forces  Right 
Yabloko Centre 
Agrarian-Industrial Deputy Group  Left 
Deputy Group "People's Deputy"  Centre 
Deputy Group "Russian Regions"  Centre 
Interregional Movement "Unity"  Centre 















Parliamentary Committees in the State Duma of Russia between 1994 and 2003 
First Duma  Second Duma 
Committee Committee 
1.  Agrarian Issues  1.  Agrarian Issues 
2.  Security 2.  Security 
3.  Budget, Taxation, Banks and Finance  3.  Budget, Taxation, Banks and Finance 
4.  Geopolitics 4.  Geopolitics 
5.  Local Self-Government  5.  Local Self-Government 
6.  Women, Family and Youth  6.  Veterans  
7.  Nationalities 7.  Women, Family and Youth 
8.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations  8.  Nationalities 
9.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots  9.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations 
10.  Federal and regional affairs  10.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots 
11.  Legislation and judicial reform  11.  Federal and regional affairs 
12.  Media policy  12.  Legislation and judicial reform 
13.  International affairs  13.  Media policy 
14.  Defence 14.  Conversion and High Technologies  
15.  Education, culture and science  15.  International affairs 
16.  Work organization of the State Duma  16.  Culture  
17.  Health protection  17.  Defence 
18.  Natural resources and the environment  18.  Education and science 
19.  Industry, construction, transportation and energy  19.  Problems of the North  
20.  Property, privatization and economic activity  20.  Regulation and Work organization of the State Duma 
21.  Labour and social policy  21.  Health protection 
22.  Ecology 22.  Natural resources and the environment 
23.  Economic policy  23.  Industry, construction, transportation and energy 
 24.  Property, privatization and economic activity 
 25.  Labour and social policy 
 26.  Ecology 
 27.  Economic policy 
 28.  Tourism and Sport  
Third Duma   
Committee  
1.  Agrarian Issues   
2.  Security  
3.  Budget, and Taxation   
4.  State Construction    
5.  Local Self-Government   
6.  Veterans    
7.  Women, Family and Youth   
8.  Nationalities  
9.  Social groupings and Religious Organizations   
10.  CIS affairs and contacts with compatriots   
11.  Federal and regional affairs   
12.  Defence    
13.  Legislation and judicial reform   
14.  Mandate    
15.  Credit  
16.  Culture    
17.  International Affairs    
18.  Education and science   
19.  Health protection   
20.  Problems of the North    
21.  Regulation and Work organization of the State 
Duma 
 
22.  Natural resources and the environment   
23.  Industry    
24.  Energy  
25.  Property, privatization and economic activity   
26.  Labour and social policy   
27.  Ecology  
28.  Economic policy   








Administrative Structure of Russian Federation: Districts, Republics, Krais and Oblasts (Part I) 
 
North-western District        Central District  Volga District  Southern District 
Arkhangel'skaya oblast'  Belgorodskaya oblast'  Republic Bashkortostan  Republic Adygeya 
Vologodskaya oblast'  Bryanskaya oblast'  Kirovskaya oblast'  Astrakhanskaya oblast' 
Kaliningradskaya oblast'  Vladimirskaya oblast'  Komi-Permyatskii AO  Volgogradskaya oblast' 
Republic Karelia  Voronezhskaya oblast'  Nizhegorodskaya oblast'  Republic Dagestan 
Republic Komi  Ivanovskaya oblast'  Orenburgskaya oblast'  Republic Ingushetiya 
Leningradskaya oblast'  Kaluzhskaya oblast'  Penzenskaya oblast'  Kabardino-Balkarskaya 
Republic 
Murmanskaya oblast'  Kostromskaya oblast'  Permskaya oblast'  Republic Kalmykiya 
Nenetskii AO  Kurskaya oblast'  Republic Marii El  Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya 
Republic 
Novgorodskaya oblast'  Lipetskaya oblast'  Republic Mordoviya  Krasnodarskii Krai 
Pskovskaya oblast'  Moskovskaya oblast'  Samarskaya oblast'  Rostovskaya oblast' 
City of St. Petersburg  Orlovskaya oblast'  Saratovskaya oblast'  Republic Severnaya Ossetiya 
  Ryazanskaya oblast'  Republic Tatarstan  Stavropol'skii Krai 
  Smolenskaya oblast'  Udmurtskaya Republic  Chechenskaya Republic 
 Tambovskaya  oblast'  Ul'yanovskaya oblast'   
 Tverskaya  oblast'  Chuvashskaya  Republic   
 Tul'skaya  oblast'    
 Yaroslavskaya  oblast'    









Administrative Structure of Russian Federation: Districts, Republics, Krais and Oblasts (Part II) 
 
Ural  District  Siberian District  Far Eastern District 
Kurganskaya oblast'  Aginskii Buryatskii AO  Amurskaya oblast' 
Sverdlovskaya oblast'  Republic Altai  Evreiskaya AR 
Tyumenskaya oblast'  Altaiskii Krai  Kamchatskaya oblast' 
Chelyabinskaya oblast'  Republic Buryatiya  Koryakskii AO 
Khanty-Mansiiskii AO  Irkutskaya oblast'  Koryakskii AO 
Yamalo-Nenetskii AO  Kemerovskaya oblast'  Magadanskaya oblast' 
 Krasnoyarskii  Krai  Chukotskii  AO 
  Novosibirskaya oblast'  Primorskii Krai 
 Omskaya  oblast'  Sakhalinskaya oblast' 
 Taimyrskii  AO  Khabarovskii  Krai 
  Tomskaya oblast'  Republic Sakha (Yakutiya) 
 Republic  Tyva   
 Ust'-Ordynskii  AO   
 Republic  Khakasiya   
 Chitinskaya  oblast'   





























                                                      
i The information on energy roll calls between 1994 and 2003 relies on INDEM database 
materials and personal research in the archives of central Russian newspapers and 
journals. INDEM (Informatics for Democracy) is a non-profit organization of applied 
political research located in Moscow and its database includes all roll call votes held in the 
State Duma since its constitutional establishment in December 1993.   
ii This information is based on the summary of the respective plenary session, as it is 
provided by the INDEM database.  
iii Id. 
iv Id.   
v Id. 




x Besides this restriction we have some missing values for one of the independent variable 
(age) in the second (19 observations) and Third Duma (5 observations). The obtained 
results remain robust when omitting the age variable in the estimations.  
xi The quantitative information on regional energy production comes from the Federal 
Service of Statistics, known as Goskomstat. This is the official state provider of statistical 
information in Russian Federation. In this paper we use the 2003 and the 2007 editions of 
the statistical package on Russian Regions.   
xii Please see Tables A3, Parts I and II, in the appendix below.  
xiii We slightly changed the structure of the specification due to the non-linear relationship 
between age and ranking. 